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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
ESSAYS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 
by 
Daniel Osvaldo Murgo 
Florida International University, 2010 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Cem Karayalcin, Major Professor 
The first chapter analizes conditional assistance programs. They generate 
conflicting relationships between international financial institutions (IFIs) and member 
countries. The experience of IFIs with conditionality in the 1990s led them to allow 
countries more latitude in the design of their reform programs. A reformist government 
does not need conditionality and it is useless if it does not want to reform. A government 
that faces opposition may use conditionality and the help of pro-reform lobbies as a lever 
to counteract anti-reform groups and succeed in implementing reforms. 
The second chapter analizes economies saddled with taxes and regulations. I 
consider an economy in which many taxes, subsidies, and other distortionary restrictions 
are in place simultaneously. If I start from an inefficient laissez-faire equilibrium because 
of some domestic distortion, a small trade tax or subsidy can yield a first-order welfare 
improvement, even if the instrument itself creates distortions of its own. This may result 
in "welfare paradoxes". The purpose of the chapter is to quantify the welfare effects of 
changes in tax rates in a small open economy. I conduct the simulation in the context of 
an intertemporal utility maximization framework. I apply numerical methods to the 
model developed by Karayalcin. I introduce changes in the tax rates and quantify both the 
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impact on welfare, consumption and foreign assets, and the path to the new steady-state 
values.  
The third chapter studies the role of stock markets and adjustment costs in the 
international transmission of supply shocks. The analysis of the transmission of  a 
positive supply shock that originates in one of the countries shows that on impact the 
shock leads to an inmediate stock market boom enjoying the technological advance, 
while the other country suffers from depress stock market prices as demand for its equity 
declines. A period of adjustment begins culminating in a steady state capital and output 
level that is identical to the one before the shock. The the capital stock of one country 
undergoes a non-monotonic adjustment. The model is tested with plausible values of the 
variables and the numeric results confirm the predictions of the theory. 
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I. VIABILITY OF CONDITIONAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS WITH 
ENDOGENOUS LOBBY FORMATION 
 
I.I Introduction 
 
Conditional assistance programs consist of financial and technical help that 
International Financial Institutions (IFI) provide to member countries in the face of major 
macroeconomic and structural disequilibrium. These programs require the interaction of 
two parties: an assistance-providing IFI and an assistance-receiving member country. The 
relationship is regulated in general by the charter of the IFI and in particular by the terms 
and conditions of each individual agreement. The process as a whole, however, is 
influenced by the domestic political dynamic in the receiving country. To study the IFI-
country relationship is important to analyze the behavior of the different players 
involved. First I will briefly analyze the evolution of the IFIs approach to conditional 
lending. Then I will consider the domestic political dynamic in the assistance receiving 
country. And finally I will explain how these elements interact. 
 
I.II The Evolution of Conditional Lending over time 
Perhaps the two best known International Financial Institutions (IFIs) are the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), commonly known as the World Bank (WB). They were created in 
July 1944 as a result of the Bretton Woods Conference. At the time of their creation, 
"their purposes were clearly delineated: financial stabilization for the one and postwar 
reconstruction and economic development for the other."1 Article I of the Articles of 
                                                      
1 Broughton, James M., (2001), Chapter 20, p. 997. 
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Agreement sets out the Fund's main responsibilities: promote international monetary 
cooperation; facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade; promote 
exchange stability; assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments; and 
make its resources available (under adequate safeguards) to members experiencing 
balance of payments difficulties. The Bank, on the other hand, must assist in the 
reconstruction and development of territories of members by facilitating the investment 
of capital for productive purposes; promote private foreign investment by means of 
guarantees or participations in loans and other investments made by private investors; 
promote the long-range balanced growth of international trade and the maintenance of 
equilibrium in balances of payments; arrange the loans made or guaranteed so that the 
more useful and urgent projects will be dealt with first; and conduct its operations with 
due regard to the effect of international investment on business conditions in the 
territories of members. 
Both institutions impose conditions on the countries that receive financial help. 
Conditional lending did not change much for three decades. However, the oil crises of the 
1970s and the debt crisis of the 1980s forced the Bank to move into structural adjustment 
lending.2 The change towards structural adjustment lending intensified in the 1990s 
following the wave of economic restructuring undertaken by countries in Latin America, 
Eastern Europe, Russia and the members of the former Soviet Union, and Asia. "During 
the eleven years from 1979 through 1989, the world economy evolved in seemingly small 
but ultimately dramatic and profound ways. From a starting point at which the state was 
viewed as holding a primary responsibility for controlling economic development, the 
                                                      
2 Salop, Joanne in Williamson (2001). 
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'third world' gradually diminished and even rejected that role in favor of privatization and 
reliance on market incentives."3 The Fund also added structural reforms as a condition for 
lending. The habitual conditions imposed by the Fund on its lending continued as before. 
The need for economic adjustment leading to sound and sustainable macroeconomic 
policies was greater than ever. However, macroeconomic adjustment alone proved 
insufficient to solve the structural problems that affected newer borrowers. Throughout 
the 1980s, the Fund supplemented its requirements of monetary and fiscal discipline with 
demands for structural reform, as a way to fully integrate those reforms in the design of 
the adjustment programs." Although that process took hold only partially and only rather 
late in the decade, it did eventually succeed in encouraging and helping many countries to 
liberalize their economic policies."4 
The Fund and the Bank have a long history of collaboration. The first formal 
agreement to coordinate their activities goes back to 1966. All subsequent agreements are 
based on that one. When the activities of the Fund and the Bank began to overlap in the 
1980s it was necessary to clarify the role of each institution and delineate the primary 
responsibility of each one. All this led to the so called Concordat on Fund-Bank 
Collaboration of 1989 that established areas of primary responsibility, areas of common 
interests and mechanisms for consultations and resolution of potential disputes regarding 
the advice to give to member countries. 
                                                      
3 Broughton, James M., (2000). 
4 Broughton, James M., (2000), p. 27. 
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The nature of conditional lending also changed. The experience gained in the 
1990s convinced both institutions to redefine the concept of conditionality. Instead of 
imposing a predetermined solution on countries to solve their macroeconomic or 
structural programs, and risking a future policy reversal, they allowed countries more 
latitude in the design of their own programs. The concept of conditionality was 
complemented with that of ownership. The concept of ownership is based in three basic 
principles: a) the country must maintain a stable macroeconomic framework throughout 
the duration of the loan; b) countries are encouraged to design their own reform 
programs, but these programs have to be implemented in a manner satisfactory to the IFI; 
and c) countries also have to implement all the other policies and institutional actions that 
are considered critical for a successful execution and completion of the reform program. 
The concept of ownership also implies the involvement of interested parties in the 
formulation of the reform program. As part of the domestic dialog, IFIs advice 
governments to consult with and engage the participation of key stakeholders in the 
country in the process of formulating the country's development strategy.5 The 
consultation and engagement does not necessarily mean influence in the design or 
implementation of the program itself, but at least to take into account the opinions of 
interested parties, especially of those who might suffer losses from the reforms. 
The primary and formal relationship exists between the IFI and the member 
country. However, it is fairly common for staff members to maintain contacts with 
different social groups (e.g., unions, business associations, NGO, etc.) during the design 
of assistance programs or even on routine missions to evaluate the macroeconomic 
                                                      
5 The World Bank Operational Manual. Operational Policies, p. 2. 
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performance of the country. IFIs however cannot "interfere in the political affairs of any 
member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the 
member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their 
decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the 
purposes stated in Article I." 6 
 
I.III. Domestic Political Dynamic 
In a neoclassical setting a country facing a macroeconomic or structural 
disequilibrium would simply choose the set of available policies that would maximize 
aggregate welfare and implement them. In a political-economy setting things are not so 
simple. Politicians do not only care about aggregate welfare and macroeconomic 
equilibrium. They have selfish motivations as well, namely obtaining and maintaining 
power. They also have to deal with different interest groups (IG) that try to influence 
government policies so that they benefit their particular objectives. This heterogeneity of 
interests creates a conflict that is typically resolved through the domestic political 
process. Politics is not simple either. Voters will not simply choose the "best" candidate 
and elect him or her. Politicians have to woo them. They need to convince the electorate 
that they are the best option. And for this they need financial resources. In other words, 
political activity is costly. The resources may come from various avenues: individual 
contributions by unorganized citizens with defined political preferences but little or no 
power, social or political organization willing to promote a specific agenda, or interested 
groups trying to obtain economic profits from their contributions. The activity of these 
                                                      
6 IBRD, Articles of Agreement IV, section 10. 
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interest groups has an important effect on the political process. Prospective and 
incumbent officials care about the general well-being, but they also want to access office 
or remain in it for their own selfish reasons. The resources received from individual 
citizens, and to some extent from social and political groups, supposedly finance the 
procurement of general welfare. Another important portion of the funds comes from 
interested parties. These political or economic groups can be a big or small constituency, 
but they have clear ideas about what they want from the political process. They are 
willing to help the incumbent or the challenger financially, but this help comes at a price. 
This price usually takes the form of legislation or regulations that promote or protect the 
interests of the lobby. The legislation or regulation, once enacted, usually creates 
distortions in the economy. It benefits the interested parties but hurts the society as a 
whole. An often cited example of this sort of groups are import-competing lobbies. Other 
groups affected by these policies may want to counteract forming lobbies whose purpose 
is to eliminate distortionary policies (e.g., export taxes or import subsidies.) 
 
I.IV. IFIs and Government interaction. 
An appropriate combination of conditionality and ownership may be useful in 
helping solve this conflict of interests. Governments typically do not change policies 
unless there is an acute economic imbalance or there is a change in their perception of the 
relative importance of aggregate welfare versus political support. In this sense 
conditionality and ownership produce different results depending on the government's 
attitude. A government that does not see the need for reform will not be influenced by 
conditional lending. They will probably sign an agreement, take the money and fail to 
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implement any reforms. On the other hand, a reform-minded government who is able to 
design its own reform program probably will not need conditionality. The usefulness of 
conditionality may become apparent in situations in which the choices are not clear cut. 
A government may be determined to implement domestic reforms but face strong 
opposition from entrenched interest groups. In this particular case a combination of 
conditionality and ownership may help overcome this obstacle. A government that 
realizes the need for reform but faces the opposition of pro-status quo lobbies may enlist 
the help of potential interest groups that will benefit from reform. The government-
designed program (ownership), the financial help of the pro-reform group, and the 
financial assistance provided by the IFI (subject to conditionality) may help solve the 
conflict of interests and result in successful reforms. Alternatively, if the government is 
not entirely persuaded of the need for reform, the IFI may exercise its influence to 
convince the authorities to give more weight to less distortionary policies (those 
promoted by pro-reform lobbies) and less weight to distortionary policies (those 
promoted by anti-reform groups.) 
The purpose of this chapter is to show how such a situation can be modeled, and 
how the combination of external conditionality, ownership, and domestic political 
pressure can lead to successful reforms. 
The existing literature covers this problem only partially. Drazen (2002) explores 
the relationship between conditionality and ownership. Mayer and Mourmouras (2005) 
show that under certain conditions conditional lending will fail. However, they only 
consider the possibility of one anti-reform lobby, whose existence is exogenously 
determined. The process of lobby formation in this chapter is endogenous, as shown by 
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Mitra (1999) and Krishna and Mitra (2004). The results obtained are different from those 
predicted by the Mayer and Mourmouras model. 
 
I.V. Conditional Assistance with Multiple Lobbies 
The generic conflict of interest presented in the introduction can be made more 
concrete by way of an example. Suppose there is an open economy. This economy is 
small enough so that it cannot influence the world capital markets. Instead it takes the 
world interest rate as given. I can distinguish several types of agents. Some, perhaps by 
virtue of the size of their endowments, have enough to finance their consumption and 
retain a surplus. The rest of the agents are in the opposite situation and have to borrow. If 
this economy is open agents will have no problem borrowing or lending in the world 
capital markets at the prevailing interest rate. This is tantamount to a competitive 
situation in which actors only make normal profits. But some of those with excess funds 
may find this situation to be not completely beneficial. Any government policy that 
would restrict borrowing from abroad would automatically benefit lenders by giving 
them some measure of control over the market. This group of lenders therefore will find 
that organizing themselves and lobbying for some restriction on foreign borrowing (a tax 
or a quota) will benefit them as a group. One way to achieve this is to "bribe" the 
government so that it passes legislation imposing the restriction. Governments care about 
aggregate welfare but they also need financial resources for their political activities, so it 
is highly likely that with enough political pressure and financial resources lenders will 
succeed in introducing regulations in their benefit. A portion of the borrowers may have 
the power and the resources to organize into a lobby and fight the tax. They can collect 
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resource from the prospective members and make financial offers to the government. If 
they organize themselves they have the possibility of influencing the government to 
reduce or eliminate the tax. Their benefit will be lower or no taxes on borrowing and the 
costs will be the creation of an organization to collect and enforce contributions from its 
members. As long as the former is greater than the latter, the lobby will form and it will 
challenge the lenders' group. The rest of the members of the population may be borrowers 
or lenders. But the key issue is that they are so small that even if they were able to 
organize themselves they would not have enough power or resources to influence the 
government. This group is likely to remain unorganized. 
The implications of a group being able to influence the government to impose 
taxes on the rest of the society are important for the domestic economy. Taxes are known 
to introduce inefficiencies. The fewer of them and the lower they are, the less distorted 
the economy will be. There may also be implications for long run growth. An undistorted 
economy has the potential to produce more and grow more. Also low and uniform taxes 
may create a favorable climate for FDI (higher returns), which can increase growth 
further. 
Now I need to translate this example into a model, which is the task of the next 
subsection. 
 
I.VI. The Model 
Consider a small open economy that lasts for two periods. There is only one good 
that is consumed in both periods. I assume that all agents have the same preferences that 
can represented by an isoelastic utility function. The only difference between agents is 
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their endowments: ,  1,2O O Ut t tY Y Y t =  , where O  represents members of an 
organized lobby, P  represents members of a potential lobby, and U  represents agents 
that are unorganized7, and t is the time period. The mass of the population O P U+ +  is 
normalized to 1 . 
The consumer's problem is to maximize his lifetime utility function 
(1) ( ) ( )1 1 2 ,  0 1,  , ,i i i i iU u Q u Q i O P Ub b= + < < =  
where iu  is the period utility function, itQ  is consumption of individuals i in period 
1,2t = ; and b  is the subjective discount factor or time-preference factor (impatience). I 
assume that iu  is strictly concave so that ( )' 0iu Q > , and ( )" 0iu Q < . Additionally I 
impose the condition ( )'
0
lim
i
t
i
t
Q
u Q

= ¥  to ensure that individuals always desire at least a 
little consumption in every period. 
The consumer must face a lifetime budget constraint equal to 
(2) 2 21 11 1
i i
i i iQ YQ Y W
r r
+ = + º+ +  
where ,  1,2itY t =  are the endowments in each period, iW  is the wealth of individual i, 
and r is the real interest rate for borrowing or lending in the world capital market at date 
1. I assume that the consumer bases his or her decisions on perfect foresight of the future. 
The maximization problem yields the intertemporal Euler equation. 
                                                      
7 These agents may remain unorganized probably because organization costs are too high relative to the 
potential benefits of lobby formation. 
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(3) 
( )
( )
'
2
'
1
1
1
i
i
u Q
ru Q
b = +  
where the LHS represents the marginal rate of substitution of present consumption for 
future consumption, and the RHS represents the price of future consumption in terms of 
present consumption. 
If I assume a period utility function of the form lni itu Q=  the expressions for the 
demand functions are: 
( ) ( )1 1, ,1
iW
Q r Y d r Yb= =+  and ( )
( ) ( )2 21, ,1
ir W
Q r Y d r Y
b
b
+= =+  
The only price in the economy is r and is determined in world capital markets. 
Starting from the log utility function and replacing 2Q  by its equivalent from the 
budget constraint, I can express welfare as: 
( )( )1 1 1 1 2ln ln 1i i i iU Q r Y Q Yb é ù= + + - +ê úë û  
Taking the derivative of 1U  with respect to r  yields: 
(4) 
( )1 11
2
0 if 
i i
i i
i
Y QdU
Y Q
dr Q
b -=    
 
I.VII. The effects of government policy on the welfare of groups 
Let assume that the only policy instruments available to the government are taxes 
or subsidies on foreign borrowing and lending. A tax or a subsidy introduces a distortion 
in the economy. I want to know which lobbies will benefit from a distortionary policy 
and which will gain from reforms. 
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Let assume, without loss of generality, that the members of the organized lobby 
have endowments such that 1 1
O OY Q>  This implies that they are lenders. They will 
benefit from any policy that restricts borrowing from abroad (i.e., taxes on foreign 
borrowing) since that will increase the interest rate at which they lend. Assume further 
that the lobby have succeeded in persuading the government to impose a tax τ on foreign 
borrowing. For members of the organized lobby the numerator in equation (4) is positive. 
The denominator is also positive. Therefore 
1 0.
OdU
dr
>  
Members of the organized lobby will try to influence the government to impose a 
tax on foreign borrowing. If one is already in place they will lobby to maintain or even 
increase it. 
On the other hand members of the potential lobby have endowments such that 
1 1 .
P PY Q<  
This implies that they are borrowers. They will benefit from any policy that reduces taxes 
and therefore the interest they have to pay for borrowing from abroad. For members of 
the unorganized lobby I have 
1 0.
PdU
dr
<  
The intuition is that a borrower is hurt by an increase in the interest rate and 
benefits from a decrease in it. Members of the potential lobby, once organized will seek 
to influence the government to reduce or eliminate taxes. 
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I.VIII. The process of lobby formation 
With a tax on foreign borrowing in place, borrowers will have an incentive to 
organize themselves into a lobby. Once the lobby is formed it will try to influence the 
incumbent government to reduce or eliminate the tax. This influence is usually exercised 
by way of financial contributions (campaign contributions, contributions to the ruling 
party, bribes, etc.). I will show how the number of lobbies is endogenously determined. 
The government, in this model, behaves like in Grossman and Helpman (1994), caring 
about political contributions ( )C  and aggregate welfare. As stated before taxes or 
subsidies are the only policy instruments available to the government. The interest rate 
cum tax can be expressed as: 
r rt t= + . 
Given these assumptions, I want to determine the political equilibrium of a three-
stage non-cooperative game. 
First Stage. In the first stage, agents with similar interests decide whether to 
contribute to finance the cost of forming a lobby. A lobby is an organization designed to 
reduce the cost of lobbing activity, coordinate and enforce the collection of political 
contributions, and communicate the political requests of the group to the government. 
Second Stage. In the second stage, lobbies choose their political contribution 
schedules that truthfully reveal their preferences, taking into account the objective 
function of the government. Each lobby takes the contribution schedules of the other 
lobbies as given. 
14 
 
Third Stage. In the third stage the government sets policies to maximize it's 
Political Support Function (PSF), which is a weighted sum of political contributions and 
overall social welfare. 
The problem is solved by backward induction. An equilibrium in this game is the 
number of lobbies formed ( )On  and the interest rate cum tax on borrowing or lending on 
date one ( )r t . 
In the third stage, the government solves the following problem: 
(5) ( ) ( ) ( )max G i A
ir R
U r C r U r
t
t t ta
ÎLÎ
= S +  
where Λ is the set of agents ( ), ,O P U , ( )GU r t  is the objective function of the 
government (PSF), ( ) ( )1A iiU r U rt tÎL= S  is aggregate welfare, ( )iC r t  is the 
contribution schedule of the thi  lobby, and R is the set of after tax interest rates from 
which the government can choose. The set R is bounded between some minimum minr
t  
and some maximum maxr
t  Following Grossman & Helpman (1994), attention will be 
focused on equilibria that lies in the interior of R. 
The parameter α in (5) is the weight the government attaches to aggregate welfare 
relative to political contributions. The higher α is the less the government cares about 
political contributions and the higher is the importance it assigns on aggregate welfare. 
The truthful contribution schedule of each lobby i Î L  is given by 
(6) ( ) ( )( )1max 0,i i iC r U r bt t= -  
where the net welfare anchors for the different lobbies (the ib s) are determined in 
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equilibrium. As in Grossman and Helpman, I focus on equilibria where lobbies make 
positive contributions. In the neighborhood of the equilibrium 
(7) ( ) ( )1i i iC r U r bt t= -  
Substituting (7) into (5), I have 
(8)
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1max maxG i i A i Ar i r iU r U r b U r U r U rt t t t ta aÎ ÎL Î ÎLé ù é ù= S - +  S +ê ú ê úë û ë ûR R  
I go back to the first stage and analyze the conditions under which potential (pro-
reform) lobbies may form, taking the existing lobbies as organized. Let iF  be the fixed 
cost of lobby formation for the thi  group. Fixed costs can be heterogenous because 
groups differ in their organizational abilities. Also, groups that have formed associations 
for other purposes may find it cheaper to organize for political purposes than other 
groups. Organization costs may also be lower for groups that are more geographically 
concentrated. 
Let  ,
K
t jU  denote equilibrium gross welfare of the thk  sector when both the 
incumbent and challenger lobbies are in place. Let KiU  denote equilibrium gross welfare 
of the thk  sector when only the incumbent lobby is in place. Also, let C  be the 
equilibrium level of contributions by a representative lobby. 
Taking the anti-reform lobby as organized, let the members of other group decide 
whether to form a lobby or remain unorganized. Nash interaction among group members 
is assumed in their contribution decisions towards the provision of the fixed cost of lobby 
formation. However, once the lobby is formed, the lobby machinery can enforce perfect 
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coordination among the members of the group in the collection of political contributions. 
There are three possibilities: 
Case (a): The benefit to any one individual within the potential lobby exceeds the 
cost of forming the lobby. In this case, contributing to the full financing of the fixed cost 
iF  is the only Nash Equilibrium outcome. The lobby is always formed. 
(9)   , /
P P
i
O P OU U C m F
é ùê ú- - >ê úë û
 
where m is the number of members in the group. 
Case (b): The cost of lobby formation exceeds the benefits to any one individual 
but is less than the total benefit to the lobby. 
(10)       ( ), , /P P P PiO P O O P OU U C F U U C n mé ùê ú- - > > - -ê úë û  
In this case, there are two possible Nash Equilibrium outcomes: either there is no 
contribution to the lobby formation, or the fixed cost iF  is fully financed. If I assume 
pre-play communication can take place then I can use communication based refinements 
such as coalition proof Nash, strong Nash and Pareto-dominance, and therefore group 
coordination becomes the likely outcome.8 
Case (c): If the total benefit of lobby formation is less than the total fixed cost, 
then The Nash Equilibrium outcome is not providing the lobby.9 
(11)   ,
P P
i
O P OU U C F- - >  
                                                      
8 See B. Douglas Bernheim et al. (1987), and Aumann (1959). 
9 If the cost of lobby formation is too high relative to the potential benefits we are in the case of those 
groups that remain unorganized. 
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From the analysis of the above three cases, the conclusion that emerges is that a 
lobby is formed under the following condition: 
  
,
P P
i
O P OU U C F- - >  
I am interested in knowing how a reduction in the tax, and consequently in the 
interest rate, affects the welfare of the potential lobby. First I need to analyze how the net 
benefit of lobby formation is determined, and then asses the impact of changes 
(reduction) in the interest rate on aggregate welfare and the net benefit of the potential 
lobby. Let NB represent net benefit from lobby formation. The benefit NB is net of 
political contributions, but gross of fixed costs. This net benefit is given by 
(12) ( )  ( )  ( )  ( ),P P PO P Or U r U r C rt t t t= - -NB  
With truthful contributions, the equilibrium contribution level by a potential 
group when organized is given by 
(13)  ( )  ( ) ( )P PC r U r b rt t t= -   
where ( )  ( )  ( )PPb r U r C rt t t= -  is the (net of contributions) welfare or payoff 
anchor (determined in equilibrium) of the contribution schedule of a potential lobby when 
organized. 
Truthful contributions mean that once a lobby is formed it will have to pay the 
government an amount that makes it indifferent between treating the lobby as organized 
or as unorganized, given the contributions of the other lobbies. The potential lobby has to 
compensate the government for the reduction in the organized lobby's welfare and 
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changes in overall welfare do to its entry. The contribution of the potential lobby is given 
by: 
(14)  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( ), ,P O O A AO O P O O PC r U r U r U r U rt t t t ta é ùê ú= - + -ê úë û  
Proposition (Krishna & Mitra) With a pre-existing lobby in place, the net benefit 
(gross of fixed costs) to the net borrowers from forming a lobby is the sum of the changes 
in welfare created in the organized, the potentially organized, and the unorganized 
groups (appropriately weighted) that results from the creation of the potential lobby.  
 
I can see this by substituting equation (14) into (12). The net benefit to the 
potential lobby from forming can be express as: 
(15)
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( ), , ,P P O O A AO P O O O P O O Pr U r U r U r U r U r U rt t t t t t taì é ù üï ïê ú= - - - + -í ýï ïê úï ïî ë û þNB
                ( )  ( )  ( ),1 A AO P OU r U rt ta é ùê ú= + -ê úë û  
What equation (15) is telling us is that the net benefit of lobby formation can be 
expressed as the change in aggregate welfare due to the formation of the lobby. Note that 
the net benefit of lobby formation is positive if and only if forming the lobby improves 
aggregate welfare. The intuition is that the equilibrium contribution of the lobby has to 
compensate the government for the loss of welfare of both the existing lobby and the 
existing unorganized groups that are harmed by the policies induced by the new lobby. 
This is a necessary but not sufficient condition, because NB also has to be greater than 
cost. This does not necessarily mean that lobby formation has to be Pareto improving. It 
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only means that the members of the new lobby gain so much that they can compensate 
for all the los ses created and still retain a benefit. 
Having established the impact of the formation of the potential (pro-reform) lobby 
on welfare I want to go back to our question of how changes in the interest rate affect 
aggregate welfare and the NB of the potential lobby. This is a task I undertake in 
following subsection. 
 
I.IX. The effects of changes in r on aggregate welfare 
I first look at the effect of changes in r t  on aggregate welfare. To asses this effect 
I start with equation (15) and decompose it to reflect the impact on the three sectors of 
the economy. I need to sign 
(16)
( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( )  ( ), , ,P P P P A AO P O O P O O O Pd dNB r U r U r U r U r U r U r
r r
t t t t t t t
t t a
é ù é ù é ùê ú ê ú ê ú= - - - - -ê ú ê ú ê úë û ë û ë û
 
Starting form equation (4) 
 
( )1 1 11
2
0 if 
i i
i
i
Y QdU
Y Q
dr Q
b -=   . 
I assume for simplicity that β is the same for all groups. Given our assumption 
that the potential lobby is a net borrower I have that 1 0
dU
dr t
< . The welfare of the 
potential lobby before the reform, and with only the incumbent lobby organized, can be 
expressed as ( )1,POU f Y r t= , where 1r t  is the pre-reform interest rate cum tax. The 
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welfare of the the potential lobby after the reform, with both lobbies organized is 
( ), 2,PO PU f Y r t= , where 2r t  is the post-reform interest rate cum tax. If the potential 
lobby has been able to organize it must be the case that 1 2r r
t t> . Also since PU  is 
decreasing in r t  this implies that  ,
P P
O P O
d d
U U
dr drt t
> , therefore the first term in 
equation (16) is positive. 
The organized lobby is a net lender, therefore 1 0
dU
dr t
> . The welfare of the 
incumbent lobby when it is the only one organized is 1( , )
O
OU f Y r
t= . When both the 
organized and potential lobby are present welfare is ( ), 2,OO PU f Y r t= . Given 1 2r rt t>  it 
must be the case that   ,
O O
O O P
d d
U U
dr drt t
< , therefore the second term of equation (16) is 
negative. 
The welfare of the unorganized part of the population depends on whether they 
are net borrowers or lenders. I have two possible cases. 
a) The unorganized part of the population is a net borrower. In this cases 
1 0
dU
dr t
<  and   ,A AO O Pd dU U
dr drt t
<  therefore the third term in equation is positive. 
Assuming that the mass (P + A) > O and α is sufficiently close to one, I have that 
( ) 0d r
dt
t
t >NB . 
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b) The unorganized part of the population is a net lender. In this cases 1 0
dU
dr t
> , 
and   ,
A A
O O P
d d
U U
dr drt t
>  therefore the third term in equation is negative. Assuming that 
the mass (O + A) > P and α is sufficiently close to one, I have that ( ) 0d r
dt
t
t <NB . 
I can summarize the results as follows: if the unorganized members of the 
population are net borrowers, as are the members of the potential lobby, a decrease in 
interest rate will increase aggregate welfare. If the unorganized members of the 
population are net lenders, as are the members of the incumbent lobby, a decrease in the 
interest rate will decrease welfare. The unorganized group does not have political power, 
but it will support the lobby whose interests are aligned with its own. 
Lastly, I want to see the effects of changes in the interest rate on the NB of lobby 
formation of the potential lobby. The NB of lobby formation of the potential lobby 
(equation 12) can be shown in Figure I.1. Net benefits (NB) (gross of fixed costs) is 
decreasing in r t and is represented by the downward sloping NB(r) schedule in the 
graph. Given the fixed cost F, any interest rate 0r r
t £  will result in NB ൒ F, therefore 
the lobby will form. What the lobby wants from the political process is not only a 
reduction in the interest rate cum tax, but also that the level of r t is no higher that 0r . An 
increase in the interest rate cum tax beyond 0r  will render the potential lobby not viable. 
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Figure I.1 
 
I.X. IFI Conditional Assistance and Government Policy 
I have assumed throughout the chapter that the only policy instrument available to 
the Government is taxation of foreign borrowing or lending. Taxes introduce 
inefficiencies in the economy that affect long term growth. An economy that grows at a 
slower pace has the potential of being less able to repay its debts in the future. This 
element of uncertainty may add a measure of risk premium to the interest rate paid by 
domestic agents on foreign loans. This will worsens the welfare of domestic borrowers. If 
the IFI and the government agree on a Conditional Assistance Program they can induce 
changes in the interest rate in two ways: a) a program backed by an IFI gives the country 
a "Seal of Approval." Experience shows that this type of agreements tend to reduce the 
risk premium charged by foreign lenders. b) The reform, if successful, will induce the 
elimination of taxation on foreign borrowing. 
A decrease in the interest rate in this model is a change in the relative price of 
future consumption in terms of present consumption. This will benefit borrowers and hurt 
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lenders. The members of the anti-reform lobby are lenders, therefore are going to be hurt 
by the reform and fight it. The members of the potential lobby are borrowers and will 
benefit from a reduction in r t , therefore they will favor the reform. The country and the 
IFI can agree on a reform program with the right combination of conditionality (tax 
elimination) and ownership (domestic program design.) If the IFI, through the conditional 
program, succeeds in fostering the creation of a pro-reform lobby, the new lobby will be 
able to pay the government contributions at least as large as the ones paid by the anti-
reform lobby. The government being indifferent to the source of the contributions, and 
since it has agreed with the IFI to reform the economy, will accept the contributions of 
the new lobby and implement the reform (eliminate the tax.) The anti-reform lobby will 
loose its source of revenue and will see its influence greatly reduced or may even 
disappear. 
 
I.XI. Conclusions 
 
Conditional Assistance Programs provided by IFIs have the potential to help 
countries reform their economies. In order to be successful they need a domestic 
government that is convinced that reform is necessary, and is willing to design and 
implement its own program. The domestic political dynamic plays and important role in 
the reform process. If a reforming government faces the opposition of strong pro-status 
quo groups, reforms may be harder to implement. In this case the decision of the 
government needs to be supported by domestic interest group that clearly benefit from 
the reform. I have shown that given the appropriate conditions these groups will from, 
and their actions will improve aggregate welfare. A domestically designed conditional 
24 
 
assistance program, the welfare improving actions of pro-reform lobbies, and their 
political contributions may result in successful reform. A reformed economy will have 
less distortions and the potential to grow at higher rates. The changes in relative prices 
that result from the reform process may also turn the country into an attractive target for 
foreign direct investors. 
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II. WELFARE EFFECTS OF TAXES IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY 
 
II.I. Introduction 
 
Conventional tax incidence analysis tells us that increases in taxes will lead to a 
decrease in welfare. This analysis usually starts from a Pareto-optimal, competitive 
equilibrium, and frequently only one distortion is introduced at a time. According to 
Dixit10 this is not a realistic approach. "The problem is that in reality I never find an 
economy that is pristine except for the one problem in which I am interested." Usually 
many taxes, subsidies, and other distortionary restrictions are in place simultaneously. 
Dixit uses the example of international trade theory concerned with "the need to find the 
best policy to counter the distortions or constraints..." For example, if I start from an 
inefficient laissez-faire equilibrium because of some domestic distortion, a small trade tax 
or subsidy can yield a first-order welfare improvement, even if the instrument itself 
creates distortions of its own. This may result in "welfare paradoxes", namely taxes that 
improve long-run welfare rather than reduce it. The subject has been studied theoretically 
by Karayalcin (1995) in the context of a small economy open to international asset trade . 
He studies the effects of various capital income tax policies. He shows that welfare 
paradoxes may exist if increases in tax instruments improve welfare. The purpose of this 
chapter is to quantify the welfare effects of changes in tax rates in a small open economy. 
I conduct the simulation in the context of an intertemporal utility maximization 
framework. The paper applies numerical methods to the model developed by Karayalcin. 
I introduce changes in the tax rates and quantify both the impact on welfare, consumption 
and foreign assets, and the path to the new steady-state values. Section II lays out the 
                                                      
10Dixit, Avinash, Whither Greenwald-Stiglitz?, mimeo, Princeton University, 2003. 
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model, Section III shows the equilibrium of the model, Sections IV summarizes the 
theoretical results, Section V presents the calibration of the model, and Section VI 
concludes. 
 
II.II The Model 
I start with a small open economy populated by a constant number of identical 
and infinitely-lived households with perfect foresight. For the sake of simplicity I 
normalize the size of the households to one. This economy is also home of perfectly 
competitive firms that produce a single good that can be used either for consumption or 
investment. A detailed analysis of households and firms follows. 
 
Households 
Each household supplies exactly one unit of labor at a wage rate tw  per unit of 
time. They also receive interest income from their non-human wealth ta . Interest income 
is defined as ( )1 r tr at- , where r is the wold real rate of interest and rt  is personal tax 
on interest income. I assume that the world interest rate is constant. Households have 
variable rates of time preference as in Epstein and Hayes (1983) and they maximize 
lifetime welfare U over the consumption path C. The maximization problem is: 
(1) ( ) ( ) ( )
0
exp exp 1tU C z r rt dtt
¥ é ù= - - - -ë ûò  
subject to 
(2) ( ) ( )1 ,t t rz u c rt
·
= - -  
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(3) ( )1 ,r t t t ta r w ct t
·
= - + - +  
(4) 0 0,z =  
where ( ) 0u c >  is the felicity function with ( ) ( )' 0,  " 0u c u c> < , and tt  is a lump-
sum government transfer. I assume the government runs a balanced budget so that the 
lump-sum transfer is equal to the net tax revenue. 
The lifetime welfare function U differs from the conventional time-additive utility 
functions because it is recursive. This implies that the marginal rate of substitution 
between times t and s (s > t) is independent of consumption before t but no after s. This 
gives rise to a variable rate of time preference Ω at time s: 
(5) ( ){ } 10 exp .ts s u c d dtt -¥ é ùW = -ê úê úë ûò ò  
Ω at s is the following function of the utility function U(C) 
(6) ( ) ( )1,  ,s s sU Cf f f-W = - =  
where sC  stands for that part of the consumption path C beyond time s, and sf denotes 
lifetime welfare at time s. When the consumption path is globally constant, as in long-run 
equilibrium, ( ) ( )1 /sU C u c= - , and the rate of time preference is given by 
(7) ( ) ( )* * * ,u cfW =  
where the stars indicate long-run equilibrium. 
The assumption ( )' 0u c >  implies that Ω is increasing in the consumption path 
C. This assumption is known as ''increasing marginal impatience'' (see Lucas and Stokey, 
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1984). There are several arguments in support of it. For us is sufficient to say that local 
stability would fail to obtain in the absence of that assumption. 
The felicity function can be expressed as 
(8) ( ) ln ,t tu c cw= +  
where ω is a parameter measuring generalized time preference. 
It can be shown that with equation (8) the solution to the lifetime welfare 
maximization problem yields 
(9) ( ) ( )1 .rc r ct f
·
é ù= - -Wë û  
The equation of motion of lifetime welfare f  is obtained by differentiating (1) 
with respect to time: 
(10) ( )1 .u cf f
·
= +  
 
Firms 
Firms in the model are perfect competitors that employ capital, k, and labor, l, to 
produce a single good using a constant returns to scale production technology. New 
investment is financed by issue of corporate bonds, cb , and by retained earnings. Profits 
not used to finance investment, net of corporate income tax, are paid to shareholders as 
dividends. Firms deduct interest payments on outstanding debt as well as adjustment 
costs T associated with investment when determining taxable corporate profits. Total 
dividends before personal tax, π, are given by 
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(11) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 ,c cc lf k w rb T b ip t t
·
é ùº - - - - + - -ê úë û  
where ct  is the corporate income tax and lt  is the rate of investment credit. The function 
( )f k  is a constant returns to scale production function that satisfies the standard Inada 
conditions. 
In the absence of uncertainty I cannot adequately account for the differences in 
the forms of financing. Therefore I assume that the representative firm finances a fraction 
ε of new investment from retained earnings, and a fraction (1 – ε) of it issuing corporate 
bonds. Thus, 
(12) ( ) ( )1 ,  1c cb k b ke e
· ·
= - = -  
Installing investment goods is costly. It takes ( )1 /i T i ké ù+ë û  units of output to 
increase the stock of capital by i units. The installation-cost function T has the following 
properties: 
(13) ( ) ( ) ( )0 0,  ' 0,  2 '  / " 0,T T T i k T= > + >  
Corporate bonds, cb , foreign bonds, fb , and equities are perfect substitutes in the 
portfolio of households. If E denotes the market value of outstanding equity then the 
arbitrage condition can be stated as: 
(14) ( ) ( )11 gr Er E E
tpt
·
-- = +  
where gt  stands for the tax rate on accrued capital gains. This arbitrage condition must 
hold at all times. The term on the left hand side of (14) represents the after-tax return on 
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foreign bonds, while the expression on the right hand side denotes the after-tax return on 
equity. This expression is the after-tax sum of current yield and capital gains. Using (11) 
and (12) in (14) and integrating, I obtains the market value of equity at time 0: 
(15) ( )1 1
0
exp ,  1 ,  , , .g r g j jE r t dt j c g rq p q q q t
¥ - -= - º - =ò  
The representative firm chooses the time path of investment by maximizing the 
market value of E subject to the constraint i = k. This yields 
(16) ( ) ( )
2
1 1 ' 1 ' ,r g c g
i i
q f k r T
k k
q q q q e
·
- -
é ùæ ö æ öê ú÷ ÷ç ç= - - - - ÷ ÷ç çê ú÷ ÷÷ ÷ç çè ø è øê úë û
 
(17) ( )1 ' ,g l c i iq T Tk kq e t q-
ì é æ ö æ öù üï ïï ï÷ ÷ç çê ú= - + + ÷ ÷í ýç ç÷ ÷÷ ÷ç çê úï ïè ø è øï ïî ë û þ
 
(18) ( ) ( )' ,w f k f k k= -  
where q denotes the shadow value of capital and can be easily shown to be equal to the 
stock market price of one unit of equity relative to the replacement cost of capital (that is 
to say, q of Tobin's Q). Substituting (17) into (16), this last equation is an arbitrage 
equation setting the after-tax rate of return on foreign bonds to the after-tax rate of return 
on equity. Equation (18) is the familiar condition that requires that the marginal 
productivity of labor be equal to the real wage rate. Equation (17) implies that the rate of 
investment, i/k, is the following function of q 
(19) ( ) ( )*,  ' 0,i k q q
k k
j j
·
= = >  
which states that the rate of investment is an increasing function of ''Tobin's Q''. The most 
prominent feature of (16) and (19) is that neither q nor investment depends on the 
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consumption and savings decisions of households. Equations (16) and (19) constitute a 
system of two autonomous differential equations in q and k. 
 
The current account 
To obtain the dynamics of the current account I use equations (3), (11)-(19), 
f ea b qk b= + + , and recall the assumption of balanced government budget to obtain 
(20) ( ) ( )1 ,f fb rb f k i T c
·
= + - - -  
The current account is equal to output plus interest earnings on foreign assets 
minus consumption and investment spending. 
 
Figure II.1. The adjustment of q and k. 
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II.III. Equilibrium 
The model has five differential equations: (9), (10), (16), (19) and (20). To obtain 
the steady-state value of ( ), , , ,x x q k c bf=  set these equations to zero. This yields 
(21) ( ) ( )1 1 2* ,  * , ,  0,  0,g l g lq q q q qq e t t t-= - = > <  
(22) ( ) ( ) ( )  ( )( ) ( )
1 1
,' * 1 ,  * , , ,   
0  1,2 ,   0  3, 4 ,
r c g l g c r l
i j
f k r r k k
k l k j
e q q q e t t t t t- -é ù= - + - = =ê úë û
< = > =
 
(23) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
* * *,   , , , ,
0  1,2 ,   0  3,4 ,
f
g c r l
i j
rb f k c b
b i b j
t t t t+ =
> = < =  
(24) ( ) ( ) ( )* , * ,   ' 0,r r ru c r c c cq t t= = <  
(25) ( ) ( )1* ,   * ,   ' 0,r rrf q f f t f-= - = <  
I assume in (21) that le t>  so that the equity price q is positive in the steady 
state. Equation (22) shows that capital income taxes and the investment tax credit drive a 
distortionary wedge between the marginal productivity of capital f ’(k) and the world real 
interest rate r. Whether this wedge causes the marginal productivity of capital to exceed 
the world interest rate or not depends on the values of the tax rates , ,g c rt t t , and the 
investment tax credit lt : 
(26) ( )' * 1 0c gl
r
f k r
q qt
e q
ì üï ïï ï - +í ýï ïï ïî þ
    
If income taxes are uniform ( )g rt t= , the corporate tax rate is fully integrated 
( )0ct = , and there is no investment credit ( )0lt = , it then follows form (22) that 
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( )'f k r= . In other words, income tax is neutral with regards to investment. 
Additionally, (17) indicates that in the absence of the investment credit and the tax on 
capital gains q e= . Therefore, in this case, the market value of equity E qk ke- =  
equals the equity-financed portion of the accumulated investment of firms. However, 
actual tax systems do not generally have fully integrated corporation taxes, nor are the 
rates of investment tax credit set equal to zero. It is therefore useful to look at some 
representative tax rates for countries such as Canada, Sweden, and the Netherlands, 
which are generally considered to be small open economies, to have an understanding of 
the difference between f’(k*) and r as implied by the rates in (26). The effective average 
rates are roughly: 0.45, 0.25, 0.10, 0.27r c l gt t t t= = = = ; in addition 0.75e = . 
These values imply that f ’(k*) < r for the economies in question. 
Notice from equations (23)-(25) that the variable rate of time preference implies 
well-defined long-run levels of target utility, consumption and wealth. 
At any point in time, given the parameters and steady-state level of 
( ), , , ,x x q k c bf=  the five differential equations solve for x. Equation (18) determines 
the wage rate. 
The dynamic system ((9), (10), (16), (19), (20)) possesses two negative ( 1l  and 
2l ) and three positive eigenvalues, which (given the two predetermined variables k and 
bf) render a stable saddle path. Its motion along the convergent saddle-path is 
characterized by 
(27) ( ) ( )0 1* * exp ,tk k k k tl- = -  
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(28) ( ) ( )1* / * ' * ,t tq q k q k kl jé ù- = -ê úë û  
(29) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )*2 0 0 2* * exp ,f ftc c r b b k k tl m lé ù- = - - + -ê úë û  
(30) ( )* * ,t tc cf f b- = -  
(31) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* *0 1 0 0 2* exp * exp ,f f f ftb b k k t b b k k tm l m lé ù- = - - + - + -ê úë û  
where 
( ) ( )1 11 1 2' * 0,   * 0.r rf k r rc rm l l b q q l- -é ù é ù é ùº - - > º - >ë û ë û ë û  
In the perfect foresight, intertemporal-equilibrium framework adopted in this 
chapter the dynamics of the variables are determined by the long-run changes they go 
through. By this token, (27) indicates that along the convergent path the dynamics of 
investment are uniquely determined by its speed of adjustment and the long-run change 
in the domestic capital stock, while (31) shows that the dynamics of the current account 
depends on long-run changes in both foreign assets and the domestic capital stock, as 
well as the adjustment speed of both. 
Straightforward manipulation of (27) and (31) yields 
(32) ( )1 * ,tk k kl
·
= -  
(33) ( )( ) ( )*2 1 2* .f f ft tb k k b bm l l l
·
= - - - -  
It follows from (32) and (33) that if 1 2l l<  the capital stock, k, will adjust faster 
than the foreign assets holdings, bf. In other words, the current account will be more 
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persistent than domestic investment. This, however, contradicts the findings of recent 
studies. Consequently, I will concentrate on the case 1 2l l> . 
Further, since β > 0, (29) and (30) indicate that consumption c and lifetime 
welfare ϕ always rise and fall together along the convergent path shown in Figure II.2. 
 
 
Figure II.2. The adjustment of consumption and lifetime welfare. 
 
II.IV. The effects of taxation 
I now need to put the model to work to assess the effects of changes in the tax 
rates. First I will briefly present the expected results from the theoretical model. Later, in 
Section V, I will calibrate the model to evaluate the effects of changes in tax instruments 
on welfare. I start analyzing the effects of changes in the investment tax credit lt , in the 
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tax rates on capital gains gt , and on corporate income ct . They are treated jointly 
because changes in these rates do not affect the long-run target utility of households 
(equation (24)), and, therefore, do not have any effects on the long-run level of 
consumption. 
Let us start by analyzing the effects of an unanticipated permanent increase in the 
corporation tax rate ( )ct . On impact this reduces dividends and the rate of return on 
equity. The consequent incipient excess stock demand for foreign assets leads to an 
immediate drop in the price of equity q (and to expectations of capital gains), which starts 
a process of capital decumulation. The process continues until the decline in the capital 
stock pushes the marginal productivity of capital and the dividends up sufficiently 
enough so that, in the absence of expectations of capital gains on it, the rate of return on 
equity equals the rate of return on foreign bonds. 
Likewise, an unanticipated permanent increase in the tax rate on capital gains 
( )gt  reduces the long-run stock of capital. This raises the steady-state marginal 
productivity of capital and dividends, therefore the long run equity price q must also rise 
to ensure the equality of assets yields. The short-run adjustment of the forward looking 
equity-price q is driven by the long-run changes in k and q. This puts opposing pressures 
on q and as a consequence the impact effect of the increase in gt  on q is ambiguous. 
However, regardless of whether it drops or jumps on impact, along the convergent path, q 
will rise towards its higher steady-state level (equation (28)). 
On the contrary, an unanticipated permanent increase in the investment tax credit 
lt also increases the long-run stock of capital by reducing the effect of the replacement 
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cost of capital. The resulting decrease in the marginal productivity of capital and 
dividends requires a long-run fall in q to raise the rate of return on equity and to ensure 
the equality of assets yields. As in the case of the rise in gt , the opposing pressures these 
long-run changes have on q may result in a drop or jump of the equity price on impact. 
However, q unambiguously falls in the medium-run along the adjustment path. 
To see the consequences of these policies on consumption and lifetime welfare I 
use (22) and (23) in (29) and (30) and set t = 0 to obtain 
(34) ( )0 0* * ,c cf f b- = -  
(35) ( )( )( ) ( )10 1 2 1* ' * ,    1,2,4,jc c r r k f k r jl l l - é ù- = - - - - =ë û  
which show the changes in consumption and lifetime welfare on impact. It is important to 
remember that the long-run levels of c and ϕ remain the same. Note that ϕ0 is the present 
discounted value of the future felicity stream at time t = 0 and ϕ* is unaffected by these 
policies. Therefore the sign of ϕ0  –  ϕ* directly measures the welfare effects of the 
policies under consideration. Additionally, since β > 0, the sign of ϕ0 – ϕ* is the same as 
the sign of c0 – c*. 
To understand the changes in consumption c on impact recall that households try 
to attain the target utility level u(c*), which is not affected by the two policies under 
consideration. The implication is that the long-run level of consumption and the level of 
wealth and income required to support it also remain constant. Faced with these policies, 
foreward-looking households choose transition paths that allow them to attain the original 
target utility level. 
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I will now consider the effects of the increase of the tax rate on corporate income 
ct . This decreases the economy's capital stock (22) and GDP. To attain the original level 
of utility households must increase their long-run holdings of foreign assets (23). On 
impact, the long-run decrease in the domestic capital stock makes a short-run 
consumption binge possible. But the required long-run increase in the foreign assets 
holdings demands an immediate increase in savings and a drop in consumption on 
impact. If the long-run effect of the decrease in the stock of capital is such that 
( )' * 0f k >  holds, then consumption must drop on impact which implies that 
0 * 0c c- <  in equation (35). Consumption is at point A in Figure II.2. In the opposite 
case c will jump on impact to point B in Figure II.2. Welfare (ϕ) follows consumption 
(c0), so if consumption jumps on impact lifetime welfare will jump too. There is an 
alternative and useful way of looking at this result. As I showed, the direction of the 
change in lifetime welfare do to a change in ct  depends on the sign of ( )' *f k r- . I 
know that the difference between the marginal productivity of capital and the world real 
interest rate is caused by the presence of distortionary taxes. If ( )' *f k r>  initially, the 
fall in the stock of capital caused by the increase in ct  will accentuate the distortion and 
reduce lifetime welfare by increasing the marginal productivity of domestic capital. On 
the other hand, if ( )' *f k r<  initially, the same policy will reduce the distortion and 
increase lifetime welfare. 
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The increase in gt  has similar long-run effect on the domestic stock of capital and 
the foreign assets holdings (22), (23) as the increase in ct , therefore it will have similar 
consequences for consumption and lifetime welfare for the same reason. 
The increase in the investment tax credit ( )lt  has the opposite consequences for 
k* and bf*: it increases the long-run domestic stock of capital and reduces the long-run 
foreign asset holdings (22), (23). Thus, if initially ( )' *f k r> , the increase in lt  will 
decrease the marginal productivity of domestic capital, reduce the distortion, and rise 
lifetime welfare. However, given the tax rates I have considered, I will have 
( )' *f k r< , and a reduction in lifetime welfare will seem more plausible. 
I now analyze the effects of an increase in the tax rate on personal interest income 
( )rt . Unlike the former policies this one changes the long-run target level of utility. An 
anticipated permanent increase in rt  reduces the rate of return on foreign bonds. On 
impact, this creates an incipient excess stock demand for equity, which is eliminated by 
an immediate jump in the price q of equity that lowers the yield on it. The subsequent rise 
in investment in the medium run will increase the domestic stock of capital, and decrease 
its marginal productivity until the equity price q and the rate of investment return to their 
initial levels in the long-run. 
It is also worth noting that, given the increase in the domestic stock of capital and 
the decrease in their long-run target utility level, the rise in rt  will lead forward-looking 
households to decrease their foreign asset holdings (23) across steady-states. 
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Finally I briefly discuss the motion of the current account along the convergent 
path. Since the underlying logic is basically the same as in all the exercises presented 
above, I will focus on the effects of an increase in the tax rate on capital gains ( )gt . 
Although the foreign asset holdings of households rise in the long run, initially the 
economy runs a current account deficit. To see why, consider the following. On impact, 
the drop in the equity price q leads to an immediate decrease in investment, which by 
itself would give rise to a current account surplus. However, I also saw that consumption 
c may jump or drop on impact. If c jumps sufficiently enough to outweigh the drop in 
investment, domestic absorption may in fact initially rise, causing a current account 
deficit. As the economy increases its long-run holdings of foreign assets, it must, 
however, run a current account surplus later. This implies a non-monotonic adjustment of 
the current account. On the other hand, if c drops on impact, or if the jump in c is 
outweighed by initial domestic capital decumulation, the economy will run a current 
account surplus on impact, and will adjust monotonically. 
 
II.V. Calibration of the Model 
With the theoretical model in place, I proceeded to numerically calibrate it. Table 
II.1 summarizes the information about the starting values of the main variables. 
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rt  ct  gt  lt  r 
0.45  0.25  0.27  0.10  0.06  
( )1r rq t= -  ( )1c cq t= - ( )1g gq t= - ε  ω 
0.55 0.75 0.73 0.75 -0.59 
Table II.1 
  
To estimate GDP I use a CES production function of the form 
 ( ) ( )
1
, 1f k l A k lr r rd d -- -é ù= + -ê úë û  
where the values of the parameters are: A = 1.10746; δ = 0.4 and ρ = 0.5. The size of the 
labor force l is normalized to one. The value of A comes from equation (22), 
( )' *f k r=  , and δ, ρ, and r are calibrated to fit stylized facts and to deliver a 
meaningful steady state. 
With the starting values and the equilibrium equations stated in (21)-(25) I obtain 
the following steady-state value of x* = x*(q*,k*,c*,ϕ*,bf*) 
 
q* k* c* ϕ* bf*  
0.89411 7.24145 1.86451 -30.303  -1.85744 
Table II.2 
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In order to calculate the saddle-path equilibrium I start with the system of 
equations (9), (10), (16), (19), and (20). Once linearized, the system yields the following 
result: 
(36) ( )x M x x· = -  
where 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
1 1
2
1
" * 0 0 0
' 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0
' ' 1 0
r g c g
r
r r
r f k
k q
M c r
rc r
k q f k r
q q q q
j
q
q q
j
- -
-
é ù-ê úê úê úê úê ú= -ê úê ú-ê úê úê ú- -ë û
 
and x = x(q,k,c,ϕ,bf). From M I can calculate the eigenvalues of the system. There are 
three positive and two negative values. The negative eigenvalues are: 
(37) ( ) ( ) ( )21 1 11 1 4 " '2 r g r g c gr r f k k ql q q q q j q q- - -
ì üæ öï ïï ï÷ç= - -÷í ýç ÷÷ç ï ïè øï ïî þ
 
 ( ){ }22 1 42 r r rr r rl q q qæ ö÷ç= - +÷ç ÷÷çè ø  
The values of the negatives eigenvalues corresponding to x* are respectibly λ1 = -1.78214 
and λ2 = -0.165907 
 
II.V.1. The impact of changes on tax rates on welfare 
Now I investigate the effect that changes in different taxes have on welfare. I consider 
both the change on impact and the new steady-state values 
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II.V.1.1 Increase in corporate tax rate 
-30.50
-30.45
-30.40
-30.35
-30.30
-30.25
-30.20
f*
 
1.8630
1.8635
1.8640
1.8645
1.8650
c*
Welfare Consumption 
-1.90
-1.88
-1.86
-1.84
-1.82
-1.80
-1.78
-1.76
b f *
 
Foreign Assets
 
I now consider the effects of an increase in the tax rate on corporate income 
( ).ct Whether the rise in ct  increases lifetime welfare or not depends on the sign of 
( )' * .f k r-  Recall that the difference between the marginal productivity of capital and 
the world real interest rate is caused by the presence of distortionary taxes. If initially 
( )' * ,f k r>  the fall in the stock of capital caused by the rise in ct  will accentuate the 
distortion and reduce lifetime welfare. On the other hand, if ( )' *f k r<  initially the 
same policy will reduce the distortion and increase lifetime welfare. The results of the 
experiment do not exactly match the predictions of the theory. Consumption and welfare 
do jump on impact in response to an increase of one percentage point in the tax (0.064% 
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and 0.32% respectivly), but since the long-run level of consumption required to support 
the target utility level u(c*) is not affected by this tax policy, eventually both 
consumption and welfare drift towards theirs initial values. Foreign assests on the other 
hand improve by 2.85%. 
 
II.V.1.2. Increase in the rate on accrued capital gains 
-30.32
-30.30
-30.28
-30.26
-30.24
-30.22
-30.20
f*
 1.8645
1.8650
1.8655
1.8660
c*
 
Welfare  Consumption  
-1.86
-1.85
-1.84
-1.83
-1.82
-1.81
-1.80
-1.79
b f *
 
Foreign Assets
 
An increase in gt has similar long-run effects on the domestic stock of capital and 
the foreign assets holdings ((22) and (23)) as an increase in .ct  Therefore it will have 
similar effects on consumption and lifetime welfare for the same reasons. Welfare jumps 
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on impact 0.33% do to an increase of one percentage point in the tax policy rate. 
Consumption also jumps on impact, but only 0.065%. However both return to the initial 
steady-state level as the tax under consideration does not affect the long-run target utility 
level and welfare. Foreign assets find a new steady-state 2.93% above the original level. 
 
II.V.1.3. Increase in personal income tax rate 
-31.0
-30.8
-30.6
-30.4
-30.2
f*
 1.860
1.862
1.864
1.866
1.868
1.870
c*
 
Welfare  Consumption  
-2.00
-1.95
-1.90
-1.85
-1.80
-1.75
-1.70
b f *
 
Foreign Assets
 
The theoretical model tells us that an increase in the tax rate on personal interest 
income ( )rt  changes the long-run target level of utility. With the increase in rt  
households' long-run utility target falls and consequently they have to reduce their long-
run consumption. To see the effect of this policy on households' lifetime consumption 
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and welfare I can rewrite equations (34) and (35) incorporating the long-run changes in c 
and ϕ: 
(38) ( )( )( ) ( )1 30 0 1 2 1 2' * *,c c r r k f k r cl l l l-+ - é ù- = - - - - -ë û  
(39) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 30 0 1 2 1 2' * *r r k f k r r cf f b l l l l-+ - é ù- = - - - - + -ë û  
 ( ) ( )1 ,n nr r r rq q t t-- -  
where superscripts (-) and (+) refer to the values of the variables before and after the 
discrete change on impact and superscript n denotes the new levels of rt  and rq . 
Equation (38) tells us that if initially the marginal productivity of capital exceeds the 
world real interest rate (r), consumption will jump on impact. However I cannot infer 
from the jump that lifetime welfare increases. The reason is that although an initial jump 
in c increases welfare, consumption decreases across steady-states and as a consequence 
the new long-run level of welfare must be lower. Still, as equation (38) indicates, 
( )' *f k r>  is a necessary but not sufficient condition for welfare to improve. For small 
changes in the tax rate, the reduction in the distortion implied by an initial ( )' *f k r>  
and the rise in the capital stock will raise lifetime welfare. In the empirically more 
plausible case, consumption and lifetime welfare may drop on impact. 
The results of the simulation broadly coincide with what the theory predicts. 
Nevertheless there are some paradoxes. Although I have ( )' *f k r<  before and after11 
the increase in rt , consumption jumps 0.07% on impact in response to an increase of one 
                                                      
11The values of ( )' *f k  before and after are respectively 0.054 and 0.053. 
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percentage point in the tax rate. Eventually the new long-run level of consumption drifts 
towards a value below the initial steady-state by 0.06%. Welfare on the other hand drops 
on impact 1.19% and continues to decrease until it reaches its new steady-state level, 
1.85% below the initial one. Foreign assests do not jump or drop on impact. They drift to 
a new steady-state value, 4.87% below the initial one. 
 
II.V.1.4. Increase in the rate of investment credit 
 -30.50
-30.45
-30.40
-30.35
-30.30
-30.25
-30.20
f*
 1.8630
1.8635
1.8640
1.8645
1.8650
c*
Welfare  Consumption  
-1.94
-1.92
-1.90
-1.88
-1.86
-1.84
-1.82
-1.80
b f *
 
Foreign Assets 
 
I now consider the effects of an increase in the investment tax credit lt . I can 
apply the same logic as in the case of an increase in ct , only this time the effects are 
reversed. Whether the rise in lt  increases lifetime welfare or not also depends on the sign 
of ( )' *f k r- . As I mentioned before, the difference between the marginal productivity 
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of capital and the world real interest rate is caused by the presence of distortionary taxes. 
If initially ( )' * ,f k r>  the increase in the stock of capital caused by the rise in lt  will 
reduce the distortion and increase lifetime welfare. On the other hand, if ( )' *f k r<  
initially, the same policy will increase the distortion and decrease lifetime welfare. The 
numerical values of our exercise tell us that our case is the latter. Consumption and 
welfare drop on impact by 0.08% and 0.41% respectively. They increase afterwards and 
eventually reach theirs original steady-state level. Foreign assets find a new steady-state 
level 3.27% below the original one. 
 
II.VI. Conclusions 
I presented a model of a small open economy where households have endogenous 
time preferences and investment is subject to adjustment costs. I used the theoretical 
model to predict the effects of changes in various tax rates considered. Later I calibrated 
the model selecting a set of plausible values for the variables and running numerical 
simulation to estimate the effects of different tax policies. The quantitative results 
generally coincide with the prediction of the theory. These results are affected by 
differences between the marginal productivity of capital and the world real interest rate. 
Depending on the sign of the difference between the two, increase in taxes may lead to 
decreases or increase in lifetime welfare, giving way to welfare paradoxes. This results 
stem from the fact that the economy is distorted by the presence of taxes. Increases in 
taxes may sometimes counteract some of those distortions resulting in a welfare increase 
instead of the expected decrease. Hence the welfare paradox. 
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III. STOCK MARKETS, ADJUSTMENT COSTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
TRANSMISSION OF SHOCKS. A CALIBRATION EXERCISE. 
 
III.I. Introduction 
In an integrated world economy with capital mobility disturbances that originate 
in one country are rapidly transmitted to other countries. The model presented in this 
chapter describes a two-country model in an integrated world economy. Each country has 
infinitely lived households that maximize lifetime welfare, and competitive, profit 
maximizing firms that choose investment subject to adjustment costs. Equities issued by 
firms in both countries are perfect substitutes in the portfolio of households. In the 
chapter I will assess numerically the role of stock markets in the transmission of supply 
shocks. I will also focus on the long run determinants of external indebtedness, the 
dynamics of capital accumulation, equity prices and the current account. 
It is interesting to analyze the transmission of a positive supply shock that 
originates in either of the countries under consideration. On impact, the shock leads to an 
immediate stock market boom in the country where the shock takes place12. The stock 
market of the other country suffers the opposite effects: there is a decline in the demand 
for equities and as a consequence prices fall. This triggers a process of capital 
decumulation over time. But as the stock of capital declines, its productivity increases 
leading to an appreciation of the price of its equity. Once the price is above the unitary 
replacement cost of capital, a period of capital accumulation ensues. The resulting steady-
state level of capital and output is identical to the one before the shock. The adjustment of 
                                                      
12 For example: a technological breakthrough that improves overall productivity in the country where the 
shock takes place. 
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the capital stock in this country therefore is non-monotonic. In the economy that initially 
experiences the positive technological shock the continuous accumulation of capital 
lowers its productivity and the price of equities along the adjustment path. But because of 
the technological improvement this economy reaches a new steady state with higher 
capital stock and output level. Moreover, as the increase in productivity renders the 
equities issued by local firms relatively more attractive, holdings of foreign equities 
decline monotonically. 
The adjustment path described above differs from the one that would result from a 
model without adjustment costs. In that type of model it would be possible to transfer 
capital instantaneously on impact from the low productivity economy to the high 
productivity one. Capital accumulation would show a monotonical behavior and stock 
markets and asset prices would play no role in the international transmission of the shock. 
In the absence of adjustment costs, capital stocks adjust faster than the current 
account. On the other hand, when there are adjustments costs, investment and the current 
account adjust at the same speed. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section II describes the theoretical model. 
Section III studies the international transmission of supply shocks for different sets of 
parameters. Section VI contains summary and conclusions. 
 
III.II. The Model 
The integrated world economy consists of two large countries known as “home” 
and “foreign”. Both countries have the same number of infinitely lived households. The 
number is constant and normalized to one. Firms in each country produced the same good 
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that can be used for production or consumption. The price of the good serves as the 
numeraire. 
 
Households 
Infinitely lived households with perfect foresight consume, save and supply one 
unit of labor inelastically per unit of time. Saving is the accumulation or decumulation of 
equities issued by home and foreign firms. Equities issued by firms in both countries are 
perfect substitutes in the portfolio of households. They yield a common rate of return . 
Home and foreign households have the same and constant rate of time preference, 
(1)                                   = *. 
The asterisks indicate the foreign country. 
The nonhuman wealth, (*)a , of any household is given by 
(2) * ,a qk q b   * * * *a q k q b  , 
where q and *q  represent the price of an ownership claim on physical capital stocks k  
and *k , and b represents ownership claims of non-domestic capital. For the sake of 
simplicity the analysis will be restricted to those parameter configurations that render the 
home country as the net creditor in the initial and final steady state. 
Households, both home and foreign, take the rate of return on equity , and the 
wage rate, w, as given and maximize lifetime welfare  U C over the consumption path 
C: 
(3)                         
0
max expU C u c dt
   
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subject to 
(4)                              a t t a t w t c t     
where c is consumption and u is the instantaneous utility function with 0, ' 0u u   and 
" 0u  . It is convenient to adopt a specific form for the instantaneous utility function, 
namely the logarithmic form, 
(5)                                 lnu c t c t       . 
The solution of the lifetime welfare maximization problem (3)-(5) of the home 
household is, in addition to (4), 
(6)                                    c c    
as the law of motion of consumption, c, of home households. 
The dynamic behavior of foreign households’ wealth, consumption and lifetime 
utility along an optimal path are described by the following conditions: 
(7)    * * * * *a a w c     
(8)     * * * *c c    
 
Firms 
Firms that are identical and competitive use capital and labor to produce the 
single good in both countries. For the sake of simplicity the depreciation rate is set equal 
to zero. When firms adjust capital stocks there are internal costs. Suppose it takes home 
firms  1 /i T i k    units of output to accumulate capital, k, by i units. T denotes the 
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installation technology. Assuming that the installation cost function is linearly 
homogeneous in i and k, and satisfies 
(9) ( / ),T T i k   0 0,T    ' . 0,T        2 ' . / " . 0,T i k T   
then maximization of the present value of the firm’s cash flow    1g k i T   13 implies 
setting the shadow value of q of investment equal to 1 plus the marginal cost of 
investment. The same concept translated into a function gives, 
(10)         1 . / ' . .q T i k T      
This implies that the rate of growth of the per capita capital stock. i/k, is positively 
related to the Tobin’s q – the excess of equity price over the unitary replacement cost of 
capital. 
(11)    ,i k q
k k


    ' 0,q    1 0  , 
where the last equality indicates that when q = 1 investment is zero14. 
In addition to (10), present-value maximization by firms yields 
(12)      ' .w g k g k k     
If the only technological difference between countries is captured by the 
productivity terms,  and *, the foreign equivalents of (11) and (12) are given by 
 
(13)   * * ,
* *
i k k
k k


    ' * 0,q    * 1 0,   
                                                      
13  g k stands for per capita home output, with  ' 0g k   and  " 0g k  . 
14 When q = 1 the shadow value of capital equals the unitary replacement cost of physical capital. 
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(14)      * * * ' * * ,w g k g k k     
where it is assumed that the installation technology  .T  is the same in both countries. 
 
Markets and prices 
Three markets are of interest for our analysis: the world stock market, the world 
capital market, and the world output market. 
The world stock market makes sure that at any point in time households are 
satisfied with the stock composition of their portfolios. This requires that the expected 
rate of return on home and foreign equities,  and *, be the same at all times. This 
implies 
(15)     * * * * / * * */ * / / ,q i q k q q qi qk q q                  
where the terms in square brackets denote an equity’s current yield, and /q q

and * / *q q

 
represent expected and actual capital gains (perfect foresight is assumed). The current 
yield terms follow from the assumption that total current payout by home firms (or 
foreign firms) to equity-holders has two components: cash dividends and the value of 
equity dividends. Cash dividends, denoted (in the case of home firms) by 
   1g k i T w     , reflect the assumption that firms finance investment 
exclusively by retained earnings. Equity dividends are denoted by qi . 
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It helps to rewrite (15) in the following slightly different form, i.e., 
(16)        / / * * / * ,q qi k qi k            
   * / ,q q   
where   is the relative equity price. 
For the world output market to clear it is required that the world supply of output, 
   * * ,g k g k  be equal to the sum of the world consumption demand, *,c c and 
world investment demand,    1 * 1 *i T i T    
(17)         * * * 1 * 1 * .g k g k c c i T i T         
This can be solved for q: 
(18)      , *, , , *, , * ,      0 1, 2,6,7 ,    0 3, 4,5 .i jq q k k c c q i q j        
Ceteris paribus, increases in *, *k   and decreases in   (because it reduces q* 
and, therefore, foreign investment) and c* create an excess world supply of output. This 
is eliminated by a fall in the price of current output relative to current home capital stock, 
1/ .q  
The analysis of world capital market equilibrium will help determine the rate at 
which home households accumulate foreign equity. This is the market in which flows of 
equity of uniform yield are traded, using current output as a means of payment. For the 
world capital market to be in equilibrium, net world household saving must be equal to 
zero. It follows from (2), (4) and (15) that world capital market equilibrium requires 
(19)          1* 1 * * * / * .b q g k i T q i b k c           
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This completes the description of the dynamic system. Using (18) in (6), (8) and 
(15) solves for the point-in-time real interest rate of the economy, 
(20)     1 2, *; , * ,        0,      0      3, 4 .ik k i            
The intuition underlying the partial derivatives is the following. Ceteris paribus, a rise in 
k, or k*, creates a world excess supply of output, which is eliminated by a decrease in the 
price of current output relative to future output, . Increases in productivity, that is in  or 
*, raise profits and thus the rate of return on equity, . 
 
Equilibrium and dynamic adjustment 
The evolution of the economy over time is described by the differential equations 
(6), (8), (11), (13), (16) and (19) in conjunction with equations (18) and (20). This system 
can be simplified first by noting that (6) and (8) yield / * / * ,c c c c      from which it 
immediately follows that 
(21)    
_
* .c c  
That is, the foreign consumption level is proportional to the home level, where the 
proportionality factor 
_  remains constant along optimal paths being determined by 
steady-state conditions. 
Second, observe from (6), (11), (13) and (16) that they form a dynamic subsystem 
independent of (19). Using standard methods on this subsystem yields the following 
solution for the dynamics of the two capital stocks k and k*: 
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(22)         _ _1 2 1 21 1 * *2 2k k t k k t k   
                 
(23)         _ _1 2 1 21 1* * * ,2 2k k t k k t k   
                 
where 1 2.   
To determine the adjustment of net foreign assets along the optimal path, I now 
linearize (19) using (18), (22), (23) and the conventional intertemporal solvency 
condition  lim exp 0
t
b t   to obtain 
(24)       _ _ _1 1 * * *
2 2
b t b k t k k t k                
and 
(24')            _ _ _1 10 0 0 * 0 * * 0 ,
2 2
b b k k k k                
where 
       2 2 2 1 1/ exp / exp ,t t            
       2 2 2 1 1* / exp / exp ,t t            
     _ 12 / 2 .g k b g k         
Along an optimal path,  and * measure the effects of changes in the home 
capital stock k and the foreign capital stock k* on the net foreign asset holdings b. To see 
the implications of expression , for instance, note the following. The term 2 0   
describes the effect, ceteris paribus, of an increase in k on the current account through 
changes in the relative asset price . A rise in the home capital stock reduces its marginal 
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productivity, driving the relative price of foreign equity   up. This raises the current 
yield on foreign equity and results in an increasing current account balance if the home 
country is a net creditor, as I have assumed. The term - describes the effect of an 
increase in k on the current account, with  being held constant. This operates through 
two channels. First, the rise in k increases home output and thus the current account. 
Second, it pushes up home consumption c and lowers the rate of interest  and the current 
account. For realistic values of output and the net foreign assets, the term  is seen to be 
negative. 
I now turn to the characterization of the steady state. First, observe from (11), (13) 
and the definition of  that in the steady state 
(25)  
_ _ _
* 1.q q     
Using the definitions of  and *, and setting (6), (8), (22) and (25) equal to zero, 
yields 
(26)  
_ _ _
' * ' * .g k g k                
At the steady state, the world real rate of interest coincides with the marginal 
productivity of capital in the two countries and the common pure rate of time preference 
. The capital stocks in each country are determined only by their respective 
technologies and the rate of time preference. 
The steady-state levels of the other variables are then determined by 
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(27a)   
_ _ _ _
* * *g k g k c c              
(27b)   
_ _ _ _ _
* * *b c g k g k c                
and (24'). The two national capital stocks being determined by (26), the world output 
market equilibrium condition (27a) determines steady-state world consumption, 
_ _
*c c . 
Equation (24') then yields the steady-state net foreign asset holdings, 
_
b which depends on 
the initial stocks of k, k* and b. This well-known result is due to the integration of the 
capital markets of the home and foreign countries, the households of which possess 
identical pure rates of time preference. One important consequence of this is that the 
adjustment of the world economy is hysteretic: temporary shocks will have permanent 
effects. Turning to the determination of the steady-state levels of c and c*, I find from 
(27b) that these equal domestic output plus net interest income from holdings of 
nondomestic equities. The ratio of 
_
*c to 
_
c yields 
_ . 
 
III.III. A Supply Shock 
Suppose now that initially the world economy is in steady-state equilibrium with 
 = *. The question I wish to answer is how does the integrated world economy adjusts 
in response to an unanticipated, permanent, positive supply shock at t = 0 that increases . 
Across steady states, given k and k*, the rise in the productivity of home capital 
creates an excess stock demand for home equity, the elimination of which requires an 
increase in the home capital stock. Since foreign productivity remains unchanged, so does 
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the foreign capital stock. The increase in world output enables the world economy to 
raise its consumption, c + c*. One can also show that both c and c* rise; i.e. the benefits 
of the home productivity shock are shared with the foreign country. Finally, net foreign 
asset holdings of home households decrease across steady states (Figure A.III.3). 
Intuitively, this conclusion follows from the increased productivity of the home capital 
stock which makes equities issued by home firms more attractive relative to those of 
foreign firms, and which thus directs world savings to the home country. 
To give a better idea I will start the exercise with the initial values of the variables 
involved in the exercise. Table III.1 summarizes those values. 
 
Parameters Values 
 0.05 
_   
 0.28 
* 0.28 
 1/3 
Table III.1
 
I will assign a specific form to the production function in both countries such that: 
g(k) =  k ^ and g(k*) = * k*^, where  and * are the productivity parameters of 
home and foreign country respectively and  is the share of capital in total output, the 
same for both countries. With these values of the parameters I can calculate the values of 
the variables previous to the productivity shock. They are summarized in Table III.2. 
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Variables Pre-Shock Values 
k 2.55035 
k* 2.55035 
c 0.382553 
c* 0.382553 
y 0.382553 
y* 0.382553 
'
1   0.9 
t 0 
b 0 
1  -0.00560147 
1  -0.15 
2  -0.0225869 
 -0.56117 
* -0.0611704 
Table III.2
 
Now assume there is an unanticipated, permanent, positive supply shock in home 
country such that now   > *. Let us assume further that the shock is exactly 1% so that 
δ is know 0.2828. The change initially affects production and consumption in the home 
country but the variables in foreign country remain unchanged. Table III.3 summarizes 
the changes in capital stock, consumption, net foreign assets (b), wages and the rate of 
return on capital (ρ), both on impact and the steady state values. For comparison purposes 
the table contains the pre-shock values. Initial values are indicates with “(0)” and steady 
state values with “(∞)”. 
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Value of δ = 0.28 Value of δ = 0.2828 (1% positive 
productivity shock. χ = 0.9)  
Short Run Steady State Shorty Run Steady State 
k(0) = 2.55035 k(∞) = 2.55035 k(0) = 2.55035 k(∞) = 2.5887 
k*(0) = 2.55035 k*(∞) = 2.55035 K*(0) = 2.55035 k*(∞) = 2.55035 
c(0) = 0.382553 c(∞) = 0.382553 c(0) = 0.377683 c(∞) = 0.38756 
c*(0) = 0.382553 c*(∞) = 0.382553 c*(0) = 0.377792 c*(∞) = 0.38756 
b = 0 b = 0 b = -0.317615 b = 0.0149153 
w(0) = 0.255035 w(∞) = 0.255035 w(0) = 0.258870 w*(0) = 2.55035 
ρ = 0.05 ρ = 0.05 ρ = 0.0502148 ρ = 0.05 
Table III.3
 
As mentioned before, across steady states, the rise in the productivity of home 
capital creates an excess stock demand for home equity, the elimination of which requires 
an increase in the home capital stock. Since foreign productivity remains unchanged, so 
does the foreign capital stock. The increase in world output enables the world economy to 
raise its consumption, c + c*. Simultaneously solving equations (24), (27a), and (27b) 
gives us the new values of ,  *  and c c b  which along with the new value of k give us y 
and y*. 
I can trace the time path of k and k* as shown by Figure A.III.1 in the 
Appendices. 
The process of convergence of the stock of capital to the new steady state values 
is slow both at home and in the foreign country. A simple visual inspection shows that 
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convergence occurs after more than a hundred years in both countries.15 The stock of 
capital shows a monotonic adjustment process until it reaches its new steady state 
equilibrium. Capital in the foreign country behaves differently. The country suffers from 
depressed stock market prices as demand for its equity declines. The country undergoes a 
[short] period of capital decumulation. As the stock of capital decreases its productivity 
increases which leads to an appreciation of the price of its equity. The price eventually 
rises above the unitary replacement cost of capital which leads to a period of capital 
accumulation culminating in a steady-state capital and output level that is identical to the 
one before the shock. The whole process follows a non-monotonic adjustment process, as 
shown in Figure A.III.1 in the Appendices. 
 
Consumption 
I can also trace the path of consumption both at home at abroad. Figure A.III.2 in 
the Appendices show the evolution of consumption over time. Consumption immediately 
begins to grow monotonically until it reaches its new steady state value determined by the 
system of equations (24), (27a) and (27b). The speed of convergence is faster than in the 
case of capital.16 
Foreign consumption follows the same pattern. It grows monotonically until it 
reaches its new steady state. The speed of convergence is similar as in the case of home 
consumption and faster than the speed of convergence of foreign capital. 
 
                                                      
15 More than a 140 years at home an even longer abroad. 
16 It takes approximately thirty year for consumption to reach the new steady state level.  
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Net Foreign Assets 
Figure A.III.3 in the Appendices shows that Net Foreign Assets (b) show a non-
monotonic adjustment. There is a decrease on impact. Then it recovers to reach the new 
steady-state in a non-monotonic fashion. 
 
Wages 
Because of the change in productivity in the home country wages are expected to 
rise. An increase of 1% in productivity increases wages by 1.5%. 
 
Elasticities 
In order to explain the effects of the shock further it is convenient to calculate 
some key elasticities. I have calculated elasticities for capital, consumption, wages (W), 
welfare (WF) and the return on capital (ρ) both for the home and foreign country 
(denoted with a star). They are shown in Table III.4 below. As the numbers show, a 
positive productivity sock elicits a more than proportional response in all the variables, 
except for return on capital (ρ) 
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δ = 0.2828 (Productivity shock 1%) 
Short Run Steady State 
, 0k de =  , 1.50372k de =  
*
, 0k de =  *, 0k de =  
, 1.194867116c de = -  , 1.386735956c de =  
*
, 1.244533437c de = -  *, 1.308838252c de =  
, 1.510380928W de =  , 1.510380928W de =  
, 1.333139069WF de =  , 0WF de =  
*
, 1.302958715WF de =   * , 0WF de =  
, 0.4296r de =   , 0r de =  
Table III.4
 
Welfare effects of the supply shock 
Finally it is interesting to investigate the welfare effects of changes in 
productivity. Since the positive productivity shock increases production and hence 
consumption at home, an increase in welfare is expected. This is what happens in the 
short run. Once the economy reaches the new steady state the levels of welfare go back to 
their original values. 
 
III.IV Conclusion 
The numerical exercise confirms the prediction of the theoretical model. The 
presence of adjustment costs shows the process of physical relocation of capital and 
66 
 
shiftability of ownership claims in a new light. The process is not instantaneous and for 
certain variables is not even monotonic. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Elasticities Chapter 2 
 
Steady-state values of the variables in the model after an increase of 1% in each tax rate. 
  
Variables  Φ* k*  q* c* *fb  1l  2l  
Initial 
Values  
-30.303 7.2415 0.8904 1.8645 -1.8573 -1.7821 -0.1659 
1% 
increase 
in rt  
-30.864 7.3216 0.8904 1.8634 -1.9449 -1.7716 -0.1645 
  1% 
increase 
in ct  
-30.303 7.1831 0.8904 1.8645 -1.8045 -1.7902  -0.1659 
  1% 
increase 
in lt  
-30.303 7.3091 0.8767 1.8645 -1.9182 -1.7729 -0.1659 
  1% 
increase 
in gt  
-30.303 7.1815 0.9028 1.8645 -1.8030 -1.7901 -1.659 
  
Effects of tax policies on welfare, consumption and foreign assets 
a) One percentage point increse in personal tax rate income rt  
 
  Variables   Initial 
Value  
 Jump in 
impact  
 %D   New 
Steady-State  
 %D  
 Welfare   -30.303  -30.6626   1.19   -30.8642   1.85  
 
Consumption  
 1.8645  1.8658  0.069   1.8634  -0.06  
 Foreign 
assets  
 -1.8574  -1.8574  0   -1.9479   4.87  
 
b) One percentage point change in corporate tax rate ct  
 
  Variables   Initial 
Value  
 Jump on 
impact  
 %D   New 
Steady-State  
 %D  
 Welfare   -30.303  -30.2063   -0.32   -30.303  0  
 
Consumption  
 1.8645  1.8657   0.064   1.8645  0  
 Foreign 
assets  
 -1.8574  -1.8574  0   -1.8044  -2.85  
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c) One percentage point change in investment tax credit ( )lt  
 
  Variables   Initial 
Value  
 Jump on 
impact  
 %D   New 
Steady-State  
 %D  
 Welfare   -30.3030   -30.4262  0.41   -30.303  0  
 
Consumption  
 1.8645  1.8630  -0.08   1.8645  0  
 Foreign 
assets  
 -1.8574  -1.8574  0   -1.9182  3.27  
 
d) One percentage point change in tax on accrued capital gains gt  
 
Variables   Initial 
Value  
 Jump on 
impact  
 %D   New 
Steady-State  
 %D  
 Welfare   -30.303  -30.2038   -0.33   -30.303  0  
 
Consumption  
 1.8645  1.8657  0.065   1.8645  0  
 Foreign 
assets  
 -1.8574  -1.8574  0   -1.8030  -2.93  
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Appendix 2: Graphs Chapter 3 
 
Time path of capital in the home country.   Time path of capital in foreign country 
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Figure A.III.1
 
Time path of consumption at home Time path of consumption in foreign 
country 
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Figure A.III.2
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Time path of net foreign assets (b) 
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Figure A.III.3
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